




There are a number of pitfalls awaiting those who attempt
to summarize and criticize a large body of writings in their field
of study. Perhaps most disconcerting is that the content as well as
intent of one’s criticisms are often misperceived by those
individuals being reviewed-with the unfortunate consequence
that key issues are often obscured and forgotten. Further
problems stem from the extreme difficulty of adequately
capturing subtle differences between scholars’ arguments-
especially when, as in this case, many of the positions being
criticized are only implicit and must be inferred. Both responses
to my critique highlight these very real pitfalls.
Both my respondents, for example, have misperceived my
criticisms of interpretations of Marx as a determinist to mean
that I deny the fact that material/ economic structures are
given analytical priority in Marx. This point has never been at
issue. My lengthy treatment of the important causal role attri-
buted to legal and intellectual superstructures and the elastic,
interpenetrating definitions and concepts used by Marx were, on
the contrary, intended to highlight how misleading the label
&dquo;determinism&dquo; is in characterizing his conception. To challenge
the label &dquo;economic determinist&dquo; is not, consequently, equivalent
to denying the centrality of material structures in Marx’s
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writings. Highlighting the overlapping and interrelated nature of
Marx’s concepts and definitions, further, is neither tantamount
to denying that useful analytical distinctions are possible nor
akin to collapsing Marx’s method of analysis into a Daoist
conception of interaction.
In responding to my critique in this manner, Wakeman seems
at one point to have my argument backwards when objecting that
Marx did not use &dquo;presuppose&dquo; to mean &dquo;ultimately determining
force.&dquo; I have, in fact, argued that in those passages where Marx
states that the mode of production &dquo;determines&dquo; exchange,
consumption, and social and intellectual life, he uses &dquo;determine&dquo;
in the sense of &dquo;presuppose,&dquo; not in the sense of &dquo;ultimately
determining force.&dquo; Modes of production &dquo;determine&dquo; these
other aspects of society because, for Marx, the mode of produc-
tion is a term used to describe the economic and social structure
of society as a whole, and includes within its very definition
specific forms of exchange, consumption, distribution, and
interrelated patterns of social interaction. To say that social
life is &dquo;determined&dquo; by the mode of production is merely to
highlight that particular patterns of social interaction are
structurally interrelated with distinctive material processes of
production, consumption, and exchange. The point, then, is not
to suggest that &dquo;presuppose&dquo; suggests more than just anteriority,
but that &dquo;determine&dquo; means something quite different from the
&dquo;ultimately determining force&dquo; communicated by the term
&dquo;economic determinism.&dquo;
For this very reason I find Wakeman’s term &dquo;unequivocally
determinist,&dquo; even when applied solely to the passages under
discussion from Marx’s Contribution, to be highly misleading.
It is beyond dispute that Marx, in these passages, and Engels,
in others, gave ultimate priority to material structures. For
philosophical materialists, material structures form the &dquo;founda-
tion&dquo; of society because they are concrete and, therefore,
measurable &dquo;with the precision of the natural sciences.&dquo; &dquo;Mater-
ialism&dquo; is a term that accurately captures the decision made in
philosophies of science where, as in Marx’s and Engels’ writings,
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material structures are consistently assigned priority. But
&dquo;economic determinism,&dquo; I submit, is a different conception
altogether. &dquo;Economic determinism&dquo; implies that a separate,
clearly distinguishable entity, such as &dquo;economy,&dquo; is the over- ;
riding causal factor. It conveys a dualistic, rather than structural,
conception of reality that fails to convey the dialectical inter-
relation of Marx’s analytical categories and the complex network
of causal relations between them. When the &dquo;economic struc-
ture,&dquo; the &dquo;determining&dquo; foundation, is defined as the totality
of social relations people enter into in order to ensure their
physical existence (Marx and Engels, 1951, 1: 328), and when
legal and political superstructures are not only closely inter-
related with economic structures but continually condition them,
what sense does it make to label this, simply, &dquo;economic de- .
terminism&dquo;? For these reasons I find the fluid historical presenta-
tions in Capital to be not in contrast with &dquo;unequivocally
economic determinist&dquo; paragraphs from the Contribution, but a
remedy to the misconceptions communicated by the term
&dquo;determinism&dquo; and a clear, practical illustration of the method
of analysis outlined in these passages.
Many of my criticisms of Marxism and Asia (Carrere and
Schram, 1969) seem also to have been misinterpreted, with the
core issues consequently being obscured. I cannot deny that
numerous predictions, assertions, and rhetorical flourishes,
some implying an ironclad necessity about historical events and .
many of which are contradictory, can be culled from Marx’s
journalistic and political tracts. When I object that Marx’s
writings on India do not constitute a theory of &dquo;Europeani-
zation&dquo; and do not make the events Marx was describing
&dquo;predetermined,&dquo; the fundamental point is not that Carrere
and Schram have misrepresented these passages.2 The core of the
critique, rather, is that these Marxian assertions and predictions
appearing in the New York Tribune and elsewhere cannot be
presented as a theory that formed a well-integrated facet of
Marx’s theoretical writings at any stage of their development.
My criticism, therefore, seeks neither to deny that these predic-
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tions exist nor to intimate that the authors of Marxism and Asia
neglected other relevant passages. This criticism does take issue
with the interpretive claims made for these specific passages and
their treatment in isolation from the corpus of Marx’s theoretical 
’
writings. The issue of contention is, consequently, the relation-
ship of these passages to the more careful and theoretically
consistent historical presentations in Capital and the theoretical
schemas laid out in Marx’s Contribution. This issue cannot be
settled by searching for further &dquo;deterministic&dquo; quotations-
these quotations themselves must be woven, if at all possible, into
a concrete and detailed exposition of Marx’s theoretical concep-
tions. Convinced that this concrete theoretical link cannot be
made, we have taken issue with the common assumption that
Marx’s fragmentary writings on Asia are an unambiguous guide
to the actual content of his theories. By introducing a relatively
detailed treatment of the relevant theoretical writings, and by
highlighting some of Marx’s other predictions and self-clarifi-
cations on this issue, I have attempted to demonstrate that these
fragmentary passages are of limited interpretive utility and,
treated in isolation, can be quite misleading.3
Elsewhere, however, the respondents clearly understand and
take issue with the content of my critique. Wakeman, for
example, remains unconvinced that mass campaigns involve a
deliberate transformation of production relations-the core of
the economic foundation of society (Wakeman, 1977). I agree
with him that the Cultural Revolution has been described by
Mao himself as a class struggle within the superstructure-but I
contend that this is only a partial view. Mao has stated elsewhere
that the very purpose of such struggle within the superstructure
is to facilitate further changes in production relations.
In the course of the revolution, only after the backward super-
structure was overthrown was it possible to put an end to the old
relations of production. The old relations of production were
wiped out and new relations of production set up ... we must
continue to carry out the transformation of relations of produc-
tion and ideological remolding. [Mao, 1960: 259]
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This conception of backward elements in the superstructure as
a barrier to changes in relations of production, coupled with the
wide differences of opinion on the nature of the relations between
superstructure, production relations, and productive forces
exhibited during the theoretical debates of 1961-1963 (Jingji
yanjiu, 1963; Gu, 1962; Sun 1962), underscore the link between
this desire to transform the economic structure and the impulse
to wage &dquo;class struggle&dquo; in the superstructure. Those theoreti-
cians who, in the early 1960s, differed with Mao’s view that
production relations and superstructure require continual
transformation during the transition period argued that the
development of productive forces requires that these changes
in production relations and superstructure must be postponed
for a period, and that this postponement can occur without
altering the socialist nature of China’s economic structure. This
theoretical expression of the resistance to Mao’s transformation
policies-later labeled the &dquo;theory of productive forces&dquo;-would
subsequently be viewed by Mao as an indication that certain ele-
ments in the Party saw these transformations as threats to the con-
solidation of their privileged bureaucratic positions-a resur-
gence of the &dquo;ideology of the exploiting classes.&dquo; &dquo;Class struggle&dquo;
between proponents of these two lines of thought was seen by
Mao as necessary to overcome this resistance to change presented
within the political and ideological superstructure. The subse-
quent changes attempted after Cultural Revolution &dquo;power
seizures&dquo; in ownership relations (restrictions of private plots),
distribution relations (wage and incentive policies), and
authority relations (management and leadership practices)-
Mao’s three &dquo;aspects&dquo; of production relations (Mao,1960: 270)-
are comprehensible only within this framework. Deliberate effort
to transform this &dquo;totality of relations&dquo; comprising the economic
structure of society is, then, the core issue of &dquo;ideological
struggle&dquo; during any mass campaign-especially the Cultural
Revolution.
None of this implies that there are no analytical weaknesses
or theoretical inconsistencies in Mao’s positions on these issues,
[392]
much less that this is the only possible &dquo;Marxist&dquo; position.
I suggest only that before we can adequately assess Mao’s
formulations, we must appreciate them, as well as Marx’s, in
their full complexity. For this reason I welcome the professed
openness to new interpretations exhibited by both respondents
to my critique and urge them to follow through on this profession
by dealing with a whole complex of issues raised by Mao’s more
recently available writings. Critical assessment of these writings
requires careful use of Marx’s most difficult concepts: the
relation between capital accumulation and the organization of
production; the relations between accumulation, production
relations, and legal and ideological superstructures; the historical
effects of changes 6f production relations (ownership, distribu-
tion, authority) on both capital accumulation and the social
distribution of political power; and the relations of modes of
exchange, circulation, and consumption with both the progress
of material production and the reproduction of social relations
and human consciousness. These issues have long been the topic
of serious discussion and debate among economists, philoso-
phers, historians, and Party theoreticians in China. When
Western scholars begin to deal with such theoretical issues, a
more balanced, truly critical perspective on Mao’s Marxism
in particular and Chinese Marxism in general will become
possible.
NOTES
1. Keep in mind the crucial distinction between the "mode" of production and the
actual process of production which forms a link in the chain of production, distribution,
exchange, and consumption. The "mode" refers to the overall social process of produc-
tion, distribution, exchange, and consumption. The actual production process, or the
specific act of production, is simply a component part of the overall structure, and is
itself endowed with no causal priority.
2. Thus, the concluding sentence of the paragraph introducing my critique of the
"Europeanization" thesis (Walder, 1977: 142) based on the articles on India, which can be
read as making this point and to which Schram reacts at length, does justice neither
to Marxism and Asia nor to my own argument.
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3. In the interest of fairness I must additionally inform readers of some misleading
passages in my original essay (Walder, 1977). My attribution to Schram of a number of
positions about Marx’s conceptions of stages of history, as Schram rightly points out,
are not direct quotes. They are based on implications drawn from his statements about
revisions of Marx by Lenin, Trotsky, and others. While the form of these attributions is
indeed misleading, I still view the implications I have drawn as both accurate and fair.
REFERENCES
CARRERE D’ENCAUSSE, HELENE and STUART R. SCHRAM (1969) Marxism
and Asia. London and New York: Allen Lane.
GU SHU-TANG (1962) "The object of political economy and relations of production."
Xin jianshe 8 (August 20), in Selections from China Mainland Magazines [SCMM]
336: 18-27.
Jingji yanjiu [Beijing] (1963) "Discussions held by China’s economists in recent years on
the question of productive forces and production relations." No. 8 (August), in
SCMM 357: 32-40.
MAO ZE-DONG (1960) "Reading notes on the Soviet Union’s ’Political Economics,’" 
pp. 247-313 in Miscellany of Mao Tse-tung Thought. Arlington, VA: Joint Publica-
tions Research Service.
MARX, KARL and FREDERICK ENGELS (1951) Selected Works. New York:
International Publishers.
SUN SHU-PING (1962) "The law that the relations of production must suit the character
of productive forces." Zhexue yanjiu 3 (May 25), in SCMM 325: 32-45.
WAKEMAN, F. (1977) "A response." Modem China 3 (April): 161-168.
WALDER, A. (1977) "Marxism, Maoism, and social change." Part II. Modem China 3
(April): 125-160.
Andrew G. Walder is currently in the Department of Sociology at the University
of Michigan, where he is studying theories of organization and modernization and
pursuing research on industrial organization in China. 
